نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
استادیار دانشگاه علوم اسلامی رضوی
عنوان مقاله [English]
Islamic financing system as an alternative to the current financial system by eliminating usury (ribā) offers alternative contracts including benevolent lending (Qardh al-hasan), contracts of exchanging and partnership contracts to solve the problem of financing in different situations. The economic literature also introduces two general categories of partnership-based procedures and debt-based as financing structures and various studies have been presented to justify the optimal debt (optimality of debt) procedure. Exchange contracts are also based on debt structure among Islamic contracts. In this article, while examining the mentioned literature and counting (considering, including) the difference between usury contracts and Islamic literature, a theoretical model based on game theory is presented with the expansion of previous studies, which in terms of the cost of contract can compare different Islamic exchange contracts with each other and with usury. In fact, its purpose is the possibility of detail between different debt creation structures and their comparison. Based on the result of this model, exchange contracts in which the ownership structure is such that the ownership of the underlying asset is at the disposal of the financier at the beginning of the contract and after fulfilling the obligations of the receiver, the property funds are transferred to him and they have priority over usurious contracts and other exchange contracts and are optimal.
16. موسویان، سیدعباس، کامران ندری و حسین میسمی، «امکانسنجی فقهی استفاده از صکوک بیع دین جهت عملیات بازار باز بانک مرکزی؛ دلالتهایی جهت تقویت بازار بدهی اسلامی در کشور»، دوفصلنامه مطالعات اقتصاد اسلامی، سال هشتم، شماره 1 (پیاپی 15)، پاییز و زمستان 1394 ش.
18. Aggarwal, Rajesh K. & Tarik Yousef, “Islamic Banks and Investment Financing”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 32(1), Feb. 2000.
19. Aghion, Philippe & Patrick Bolton, “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59(3), 1992.
20. Bolton, Patrick & Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory, MIT Press, 2005.
21. Freixas, Xavier & Jean-Charles Rochet, Microeconomics of Banking, MIT Press, 2008.
22. Gale, Douglas & Martin Hellwig, “Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52(4), 1985.
23. Hart, Oliver, “Incomplete Contracts and Control”, American Economic Review, Vol. 107(7), 2017.
24. Hart, Oliver & John Moore, “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109(4), 1994.
25. Id., Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113(1), 1998.
26. Holmstrom, Bengt & Jean Tirole, “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112(3), 1997.
27. Innes, Robert D., “Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-ante Action Choices”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 52(1), 1990.
28. Kahf, Monzer, “Riba in Islamic Economics and Finance”, Chapter 7 in: M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K. Lewis (Eds.), Handbook on Islam and Economic Life, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014.
29. Krasa, Stefan & Tridib Sharma & Anne P. Villamil, “Bankruptcy and Firm Finance”, Economic Theory, Vol. 36(2), 2008.
30. Krasa, Stefan, & Anne P. Villamil, “Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable”, Econometrica, Vol. 68(1), 2000.
31. Id., “Optimal Contracts When Enforcement Is a Decision Variable: A Reply”, Econometrica, Vol. 71(1), 2003.
32. Id., “Optimal Multilateral Contracts”, Economic Theory, Vol. 4(2), 1994.
33. Lewis, Mervyn K., Models of Islamic Banking: The Role of Debt and Equity Contracts, 2015.
34. Modigliani, Franco & Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 48(3), 1958.
35. Mookherjee, Dilip, & Ivan Png, “Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104(2), 1989.
36. Townsend, Robert M., “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 21(2), 1979.
37. Yousfi, Ouidad, “Does PLS Solve Moral Hazard Problems?”, Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9(3), 2013.